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Yale Program on Financial Stability
Lessons Learned
Deborah Perelmuter
By Mercedes Cardona
Deborah Perelmuter has spent more than three decades with the Federal Reserve System. In
2008, as senior vice president at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) and co-head
of Capital Markets Analysis and Trading (CMAT) within the Markets Group, she was tasked with
setting up the operational details of the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF). The TSLF
auctioned Treasury securities to primary dealers in exchange for less liquid collateral to
provide liquidity to those firms during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009. Perelmuter
became senior financial stability adviser within the office of the director in the FRBNY’s
Research and Statistics Group. In January 2010, she was appointed to a new position in the
FRBNY Communications Group, charged with improving the bank’s overall communications
and transparency. This Lesson Learned is based on an interview with Perelmuter that occurred
on March 24, 2021; the full transcript may be accessed here.
The appearance of distress can hurt institutions, even as they are trying to right the
ship. Regulators need to offer assistance in a way that avoids stigma.
The Federal Reserve had set up facilities to manage liquidity and stabilize financial markets
in anticipation of Y2K disruptions after calendars switched to the new millennium on
January 1, 2000. Although they were not used, some of those facilities were activated later,
when the markets were roiled by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. However,
many institutions were reluctant to tap the Fed’s discount window when the housing
downturn began to affect them, fearing they’d damage their ability to go to the market for
funding.
When banks go to the Fed’s discount window, it can create the impression that they are not
a good credit risk. Perelmuter observes,
What we were trying to do at the Fed was encourage banks to borrow, saying: “It’s
here, come and borrow.” Instead, they were willing to pay rates much higher than the
market rate, say 10%, 12%, and more in the market, because they didn’t want to come
to the Fed to borrow. We did not announce the names of banks who borrowed, but
the numbers would show if anyone did. There would be a blip up from zero borrowing
to maybe $20 million in borrowing to $300 million in borrowings. Everybody would
try to fish around and figure out who that was. It wasn’t a good feeling for anybody.
The Fed needed to send money out into the banking system to maintain liquidity without
adding to reserves and causing other problems in the financial system. The Term Auction
Facility (TAF) was meant to encourage banks to borrow by structuring the program as an
auction for what were essentially discount window loans. It was an exercise in managing
stigma and risk perception, Perelmuter explains.
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It was really an interesting psychological, sociological experiment, because we were
lending the same—collateralized funding to banks, albeit for term versus overnight.
These were the same loans, but we were putting it out in an auction-style format,
saying: “Hey, everybody come.” So, a lot of banks would come and borrow from that,
but it was seen more as: “This is another way to get funds.” We were able to turn the
discount window into something that was positive rather than negative.
It can take a while for new ideas to be understood. Keep pushing and explaining your
ideas as long as it takes.
Perelmuter started talking up the idea of the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) in early
2008, even before Bear Stearns reached critical stage. But the idea failed to get traction at
several meetings, until she reached out to the vice chairman of the Board of Governors.
I tried to push it, but it kept getting put lower on the priority scale given everything
else going on. We were all in this small group that met with [then-president of the
FRBNY Tim] Geithner every morning, and maybe it was complicated and didn’t solve
immediate problems.
I was down at the Board of Governors in Washington for another meeting, and I knew
the vice chairman at that time. I knew him back when he was head of Monetary Affairs.
We had a good relationship, so I just asked if I could go to see him. I went, and I told
him about this TSLF idea, and he said that he now understood it better. He then would
talk to other people on the committee and talk to Tim Geithner. I brought it up again,
and they said: “Now put together some term sheets. Put together how you think it
would work, and we’ll present it to the FOMC [Federal Open Market Committee].”
Continue the task of communicating and promoting transparency around your
actions, even if there is no crisis in sight.
At the height of the crisis, there was no time to spend on communicating, other than around
the many facilities that were being launched and issues directly related to saving the
financial system. That may have contributed to the impression that the regulators were
focused only on helping the financial system at the expense of the public.
I would hear in my own house—“Hey, Fed, you’re saving Wall Street, but you’re not
saving Main Street.” I thought it was really lost that the Fed generally does its business
through Wall Street banks, and Wall Street banks then make things available to Main
Street.
Those attitudes also ignored that commercial paper helps Main Street business operate and
pay their workers, which keeps the economy going. But that message was not getting
through. Perelmuter said:
I thought it was important, once all this died down, to explain this to anybody who
would listen. Believe me, I talked to everybody about how Wall Street then could
translate to Main Street and that these were actually set up to make sure that Main
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Street could then be able to do what they needed to do to stay in business. Because
Main Street can’t exist without banks, and the banks can’t exist without liquidity.
After the crisis was quelled, Perelmuter took on a communications role at the FRBNY and
worked to explain the Wall Street–Main Street nexus and the Fed’s personalities and tools to
a wide range of parties. “I would explain to professors. I’d explain to students. I’d explain to
businesspeople. To a lot of naysayers.” She was instrumental in the FRBNY evolving its
communications tactics to invite the press in more often and to have more briefings. .
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